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Abstract
The ability to deploy neural networks in real-
world, safety-critical systems is severely limited
by the presence of adversarial examples: slightly
perturbed inputs that are misclassified by the net-
work. In recent years, several techniques have
been proposed for increasing robustness to adver-
sarial examples — and yet most of these have
been quickly shown to be vulnerable to future
attacks. For example, over half of the defenses
proposed by papers accepted at ICLR 2018 have
already been broken. We propose to address this
difficulty through formal verification techniques.
We show how to construct provably minimally
distorted adversarial examples: given an arbi-
trary neural network and input sample, we can
construct adversarial examples which we prove
are of minimal distortion. Using this approach,
we demonstrate that one of the recent ICLR de-
fense proposals, adversarial retraining, provably
succeeds at increasing the distortion required to
construct adversarial examples by a factor of 4.2.
1. Introduction
While machine learning, and neural networks in particular,
have seen significant success, recent work (Szegedy et al.,
2014) has shown that an adversary can cause unintended
behavior by performing slight modifications to the input
at test-time. In neural networks used as classifiers, these
adversarial examples are produced by taking some normal
instance that is classified correctly, and applying a slight
perturbation to cause it to be misclassified as any target
desired by the adversary. This phenomenon, which has
been shown to affect most state-of-the-art networks, poses a
significant hindrance to deploying neural networks in safety-
critical settings.
Many effective techniques have been proposed for generat-
ing adversarial examples (Szegedy et al., 2014; Goodfellow
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et al., 2014; Moosavi-Dezfooli et al., 2015; Carlini and
Wagner, 2017); and, conversely, several techniques have
been proposed for training networks that are more robust
to these examples (Huang et al., 2015; Zheng et al., 2016;
Hendrik Metzen et al., 2017; Hendrycks and Gimpel, 2017;
Madry et al., 2017). Unfortunately, it has proven difficult
to accurately assess the robustness of any given defense by
evaluating it against existing attack techniques. In several
cases, a defensive technique that was at first thought to pro-
duce robust networks was later shown to be susceptible to
new kinds of attacks. Most recently, at ICLR 2018, seven
accepted defenses were shown to be vulnerable to attack
(Athalye et al., 2018). This ongoing cycle thus cast a doubt
in any newly-proposed defensive technique.
In recent years, new techniques have been proposed for the
formal verification of neural networks (Katz et al., 2017b;
Pulina and Tacchella, 2010; 2012; Huang et al., 2016; Ehlers,
2017). These techniques take a network and a desired prop-
erty, and formally prove that the network satisfies the prop-
erty — or provide an input for which the property is violated,
if such an input exists. Verification techniques can be used
to find adversarial examples for a given input point and
some allowed amount of distortion, but they tend to be sig-
nificantly slower than gradient-based techniques (Katz et al.,
2017b; Pulina and Tacchella, 2012; Katz et al., 2017a).
Contributions. In this paper we propose a method for using
formal verification to assess the effectiveness of adversarial
example attacks and defenses. The key idea apply verifica-
tion to construct provably minimally distorted adversarial
examples: inputs that are misclassified by a classifier but are
provably minimally distorted under a chosen distance metric.
We perform two forms of analysis with this approach.
• Attack Evaluation. We use provably minimally dis-
torted adversarial examples to evaluate the efficacy of a
recent attack (Carlini and Wagner, 2017) at generating
adversarial examples, and find it produces produces ad-
versarial examples within 12% of optimal on our small
model on the MNIST dataset. This suggests that iter-
ative optimization-based attacks are indeed effective
at generating adversarial examples, and strengthens
the hypothesis of Madry et al. (2017) that first-order
attacks are “universal”.
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• Defense Evaluation. More interestingly, we can also
apply this technique to prove properties about defenses.
Given an arbitrary defense, we can apply it to a small
enough problem amenable to verficiation, and prove
properties about that defense in the restricted setting.
As a case study, we evaluate the robustness of adver-
sarial training as performed by Madry et al. (2017) at
defending against adversarial examples on the MNIST
dataset. This defense was emperically found to be
among the strongest submitted to ICLR 2018 (Athalye
et al., 2018), and in this paper we formally prove this
defense is effective: it succeeds at increasing robust-
ness to adversarial examples by 4.2× on the samples
we examine. While this does not gaurantee efficacy at
larger scale, it does gaurantee that, at least on small
networks, this defense has not just caused current at-
tacks to fail; it has successfully managed to increase
the robustness of neural networks against all future at-
tacks. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to
apply formal verification to formally prove properties
about defenses initially designed with only emperical
results.
2. Background and Notation
Neural network notation. We regard a neural network as a
function F (·) consisting of multiple layers F = Fn◦Fn−1◦
· · ·◦F1◦F0. In this paper we exclusively study feed-forward
neural networks used for classification, and so the final layer
Fn is the softmax activation function. We refer to the output
of the second-to-last-layer of the network (the input to Fn)
as the logits and denote this as Z = Fn−1◦· · ·◦F1◦F0. We
define `F (x, y) to be the cross-entropy loss of the network
F on instance x with true label y.
We focus here on networks for classifying greyscale MNIST
images. Input images with width W and height H are
represented as points in the space [0, 1]W ·H .
Adversarial examples. (Szegedy et al., 2014) Given an
input x, classified originally as target t = arg maxF (x), and
a new desired target t′ 6= t, we call x′ a targeted adversarial
example if arg maxF (x′) = t′ and x′ is close to x under
some given distance metric.
Exactly which distance metric to use to properly evaluate
the “closeness” between x and x′ is a difficult question
(Rozsa et al., 2016; Xiao et al., 2018; Zhengli Zhao, 2018).
However, almost all work in this space has decided on using
Lp distances to measure distortion (Szegedy et al., 2014;
Goodfellow et al., 2014; Moosavi-Dezfooli et al., 2015; Hen-
drik Metzen et al., 2017; Carlini and Wagner, 2017; Madry
et al., 2017), and Every defense at ICLR 2018 argues Lp
robustness. We believe that considering more sophisticated
distance metrics is an important direction of research, but
for consistency with prior work, in this paper we evaluate
using the L∞ and L1 distance metrics.
Generating adversarial examples. We make use of three
popular methods for constructing adversarial examples:
1. The Fast Gradient Method (FGM) (Goodfellow et al.,
2014) is a one-step algorithm that takes a single step
in the direction of the gradient.
x′ = FGM(x) = clip[0,1](x+ sign(∇`F (x, y)))
where  controls the step size taken, and clip ensures
that the adversarial example resides in the valid image
space from 0 to 1.
2. The Basic Iterative Method (BIM) (Kurakin et al.,
2016) (sometimes also called Projected Gradient De-
scent (Madry et al., 2017)) can be regarded as an itera-
tive application of the fast gradient method. Initially it
lets x′0 = x and then uses the update rule
x′i+1 = clip[x−α,x+α](FGM(x
′
i))
Intuitively, in each iteration this attack takes a step
of size  as per the FGM method, but it iterates this
process while keeping each x′i within the α-sized ball
of x.
3. The Carlini and Wagner (CW) (Carlini and Wagner,
2017) method is an iterative attack that constructs ad-
versarial examples by approximately solving the min-
imization problem min d(x, x′) such that F (x′) = t′
for the attacker-chosen target t′, where d(·) is an ap-
propriate distance metric. Since the constrained op-
timization is difficult, instead they choose to solve
min d(x, x′) + c · g(x′) where g(x′) is a loss func-
tion that encodes how close x′ is to being adversarial.
Specifically, they set
g(x′) = max(max{Z(x′)i : i 6= t} − Z(x′)t, 0).
Z(·), the logits of the network, are used instead of
the softmax output because it was found to provide
superior results. Although it was originally constructed
to optimize for L2 distortion, we use it with L1 and
L∞ distortions in this paper.
Neural network verification. The intended use of deep
neural networks as controllers in safety-critical systems (Ju-
lian et al., 2016; Bojarski et al., 2016) has sparked an interest
in developing techniques for verifying that they satisfy var-
ious properties (Pulina and Tacchella, 2010; 2012; Huang
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et al., 2016; Ehlers, 2017; Katz et al., 2017b). Here we
focus on the recently-proposed Reluplex algorithm (Katz
et al., 2017b): a simplex-based approach that can effectively
tackle networks with piecewise-linear activation functions,
such as rectified linear units (ReLUs) or max-pooling layers.
Reluplex is known to be sound and complete, and so it is
suitable for establishing adversarial examples of provably
minimally distortion.
In (Katz et al., 2017b) it is shown that Reluplex can be used
to determine whether there exists an adversarial example
within distance δ of some input point x. This is performed
by encoding the neural network itself and the constraints re-
garding δ as a set of linear equations and ReLU constraints,
and then having Reluplex attempt to prove the property that
“there does not exist an input point within distance δ of x
that is assigned a different label than x”. Reluplex either
responds that the property holds, in which case there is no
adversarial example within distance δ of x, or it returns a
counter-example which constitutes the sought-after adver-
sarial input. By invoking Reluplex iteratively and applying
binary search, one can approximate the optimal δ (i.e., the
largest δ for which no adversarial example exists) up to a
desired precision (Katz et al., 2017b).
The proof-of-concept implementation of Reluplex described
in (Katz et al., 2017b) supported only networks with the
ReLU activation function, and could only handle the L∞
norm as a distance metric. Here we use a simple encoding
that allows us to use it for the L1 norm as well.
Adversarial training. Adversarial training is perhaps
the first proposed defense against adversarial examples
(Szegedy et al., 2014), and is a conceptually straightfor-
ward approach. The defender trains a classifier, generates
adversarial examples for that classifier, retrains the classifier
using the adversarial examples, and repeats.
Formally, the defender attempts to solve the following for-
mulation
θ∗ = arg min
θ
Ex∈X
[
max
δ∈[−,]N
`(x+ δ;Fθ)
]
by approximating the inner minimization step with an exist-
ing attack technique.
Recent work has shown (Madry et al., 2017) that for net-
works with sufficient capacity, adversarial training can be
an effective defense even against the most powerful attacks
today by training against equally powerful attacks.
It is known that if adversarial training is performed using
weaker attacks, such as the fast gradient sign method, then
it is still possible to construct adversarial examples by using
stronger attacks (Trame`r et al., 2018).
It is an open question whether adversarial training using
stronger attacks (such as PGD) will actually increase robust-
ness to all attacks, or whether such training will be effective
at preventing only current attacks.
Provable (certified) defenses. Very recent work at ICLR
2018 has begun to construct certified defenses to adversarial
examples. These defenses can give a proof of robustness that
adversarial examples of distortion at most  cause a test loss
of at most δ. This work is an extremely important direction
of research that applies formal verification to the process of
constructing provably sound defenses to adversarial exam-
ples. However, the major drawback of these approaches is
that certified defenses so far can only be applied to small
networks on small datasets.
In contrast, this work can take an arbitrary defense (that
can be applied to networks of any size), and formally prove
properties about it on a small dataset. If a defense is not
effective on a large dataset, it is also likely to be ineffective
on the small dataset we study, and we will therefore be able
to show it is not effective.
Put differently, our work shares the same key limitation of
certified defenses: when scaling to larger datasets, we are no
longer able to offer provably gaurantees. However, because
the defenses we study scale to larger datasets, even though
our proofs of robustness do not, it is still possible to apply
these defenses with increased confidence in their security.
3. Model Setup
The problem of neural network verification that we consider
here is an NP-complete problem (Katz et al., 2017b), and
despite recent progress only networks with a few hundred
nodes can be soundly verified. Thus, in order to evaluate our
approach we trained a small network over the MNIST data
set. This network is a fully-connected, 3-layer network that
achieves a 97% accuracy despite having only 20k weights
and consisting of fewer than 100 hidden neurons (24 in each
layer). As verification of neural networks becomes more
scalable in the future, our approach could become applicable
to larger networks and additional data sets.
For verification, we use the proof-of-concept implementa-
tion of Reluplex available online (Katz et al., 2017c). The
only non-linear operator that this implementation was orig-
inally designed to support is the ReLU function, but we
observe that it can support also max operators using the
following encoding:
max(x, y) = ReLU(x− y) + y
This fact allows the encoding of max operators using Re-
LUs, and consequently to encode max-pooling layers into
Reluplex (although we did not experiment with such lay-
ers in this paper). Thus, it allows us to extend the results
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Table 1. Evaluating our technique on the MNIST dataset
Number Carlini- Minimally Distorted Percent
of Points Wagner Adversarial Example Improvement
N , L∞ 38/90 0.042 0.038 11.632
90/90 0.063 0.061 6.027
N , L1 6/90 1.94 1.731 34.909
90/90 7.551 7.492 3.297
N¯ , L∞ 81/90 0.211 0.193 11.637
90/90 0.219 0.203 10.568
N¯ , L1 64/90 6.44 6.36 6.285
90/90 8.187 8.128 4.486
from (Katz et al., 2017b) and measure distances with the L1
norm as well as the L∞ norm, by encoding absolute values
using ReLUs:
|x| = max(x,−x) = ReLU(2x)− x
Because the L1 distance between two points is defined as a
sum of absolute values, this encoding allowed us to encode
L1 distances into Reluplex without modifying its code. We
point out, however, that an increase in the number of ReLU
constraints in the input adversely affects Reluplex’s perfor-
mance. For example, in the case of the MNIST dataset,
encoding L1 distance entails adding a ReLU constraint for
each input of the 784 input coordinates. It is thus not sur-
prising that experiments using L1 typically took longer to
finish than those using L∞.
Each individual experiment that we conducted included a
network F , a distance metric d ∈ {L1, L∞}, an input point
x, a target label `′ 6= F (x), and an initial adversarial input
x′init for which F (x
′
init) = `
′. The goal of the experiment
was then to find minimally distorted example x`′ , such that
F (x`′) = `
′ and d(x, x`′) is minimal. As explained in
Section 2, this is performed by iteratively invoking Reluplex
and performing a binary search.
Intuitively, δmax indicates the distance to the closest adver-
sarial input currently known, and the provably minimally-
distroted input is known to be in the range between δmin
and δmax. Thus, δmax is initialized using the distance of
the initial adversarial input provided, and δmin is initialized
to 0. The search procedure iteratively shrinks the range
δmax − δmin until it is below a certain threshold (we used
10−3 for our experiments). It then returns δmax as the dis-
tance to the provably minimally distorted adversarial exam-
ple, and this is guaranteed to be accurate up to the specified
precision. The provably minimally distorted input itself is
also returned.
For the initial x′init in our experiments we used an adversar-
ial input found using the CW attack. We note that Reluplex
invocations are computationally expensive, and so it is bet-
ter to start with x′init as close as possible to x, in order to
reduce the number of required iterations until δmax − δmin
is sufficiently small. For the same reason, experiments us-
ing the L1 distance metric were slower than those using
L∞: the initial distances were typically much larger, which
required additional iterations.
4. Evaluation
For evaluation purposes we arbitrarily selected 10 source
images with known labels from the MNIST test set. We
considered two neural networks — the one described in
Section 3, denoted N , and also a version of N that has been
trained with adversarial training as described in (Madry
et al., 2017), denoted N¯ . We also considered two distance
metrics, L1 and L∞. For every combination of neural net-
work, distance metric and labeled source image x, we con-
sidered each of the 9 other possible labels for x. For each of
these we used the CW attack to produce an initial targeted
adversarial example, and then used Reluplex to search for a
provably minimally distorted example. The results are given
in Table 1.
Each major row of the table corresponds to specific neural
network and distance metric (as indicated in the first col-
umn), and describes 90 individual experiments (10 inputs,
times 9 target labels for each input). The first sub-row within
each row considers just those experiments for which Relu-
plex terminated successfully, whereas the second sub-row
considers all 90 examples, including those where Reluplex
timed out. Whenever a timeout occurred, we considered
the last (smallest) δmax that was discovered by the search
before it timed out as the algorithm’s output. The other
columns of the table indicate the average distance to the
adversarial examples found by the CW attack, the average
distance to the minimally-distorted adversarial examples
found by our technique, and the average improvement rate
of our technique over the CW attack.
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Below we analyze the results in order to draw conclusions
regarding the CW attack and the defense of (Madry et al.,
2017). While these results naturally hold only for the net-
works we used and the inputs we tested, we believe they
provide some intuition as to how well the tested attack and
defense techniques perform. We intend to make our data
publicly available, and we encourage others to (i) evaluate
new attack techniques using the minimally-distorted exam-
ples we have already discovered, and on additional ones;
and (ii) to use this approach for evaluating new defensive
techniques.
4.1. Evaluating Attacks
Iterative attacks produce near-optimal adversarial ex-
amples. As is shown by Table 1, the adversarial examples
produced by the CW attack are on average within 11.6% of
the minimally-distorted example when using the L∞ norm,
and within 6.2% of the minimally-distorted example when
using L1 (we consider here just the terminated experiments,
and ignore the N,L1 category where too few experiments
terminated to draw a meaningful conclusion). In particular,
iterative attacks perform substantially better than single-step
methods, such as the fast gradient method. This is an ex-
pected result and is not surprising: the fast gradient method
was designed to show the linearity of neural networks, not
to produce high-quality adversarial examples.
This result supports the hypothesis of Madry et al. (2017)
who argue first-order attacks (i.e., gradient-based methods)
are “universal”. Further, this therefore justifies using first-
order methods as the basis of adversarial training; at least
on the datasets we consider.
There is still room for improving iterative attacks. Even
on this very small and simple neural network, we observed
that in many instances the ground-truth adversarial example
has a 30% or 40% lower distortion rate than the best iterative
adversarial example. The cause for this is simple: gradient
descent only finds a local minimum, not a global minimum.
We have found that if we take a small step from the original
image in the direction of the minimally-distorted adver-
sarial example, then gradient descent will converge to the
minimally-distorted adversarial example. Taking random
steps and then performing gradient descent does not help
significantly.
Suboptimal results are correlated. We have found that
when the iterative attack performs suboptimally compared
to the minimally-distorteds example for one target label,
it will often perform poorly for many other target labels
as well. These instances are not always of larger absolute
distortion, but a larger relative gap on one instance often
indicates that the relative gap will be larger for other targets.
For instance, on the adversarially trained network attacked
under L∞ distance, the ground-truth adversarial examples
for the digit 9 were from 21% to 47% better than the iterative
attack results.
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(a) Adversarial Examples generated on a neural
network using Reluplex.
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(b) Adversarial Examples generated on a neural
network using Carlini and Wagner (2017).
When we examined the most extreme cases in which this
phenomenon was observed, we found that, similarly to the
case described above, the large gap was caused by gradient
descent initially leading away from the minimally-distorted
example for most targets, resulting in the discovery of an
inferior, local minimum.
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Table 2. Comparing the 35 instances on which Reluplex terminated
for both N,L∞ and N¯ , L∞.
Number CW Minimally Percent
of Points Distorted Improvement
N , L∞ 35/35 0.042 0.039 12.319
N¯ , L∞ 35/35 0.18 0.165 11.153
4.2. Evaluating Defenses
For the purpose of evaluating the defensive technique
of (Madry et al., 2017), we compared theN,L∞ and N¯ , L∞
experiments (the L1 experiments were disregarded because
of the small number of experiments that terminated for the
N,L1 case). Specifically, we compared the N,L∞ and
N¯ , L∞ experiments on the subset of 35 instances that termi-
nated for both experiments. The results appear in Table 2.
The defense of Madry et al. (2017) is effective. Our evalu-
ation suggests that adversarial retraining is indeed effective:
it improves the distance to the minimally distorted adver-
sarial examples by an average of 423% (from an average of
0.039 to an average of 0.165) on our small network.
Another interesting observation is that while adversarial re-
training improves the overall situation, we found several
points in which it actually made things worse — i.e., the
minimally distorted adversarial examples for the hardened
network were smaller than that of the original network. This
behavior was observed for 7 out of the 35 aforementioned
experiments, with the average percent of degradation being
12.8%. This seems to highlight the necessity of evaluating
the effectiveness of a defensive technique, and the robust-
ness of a network in general, over a large dataset of points.
The question of how to pick a “good” set of points that
would adequately represent the behavior of the network
remains open.
Training on iterative attacks does not overfit. Overfit-
ting is a an issue that is often encountered when performing
adversarial training. By this we mean that a defense may
overfit to the type of attack used during training. When
this occurs, the hardened network will have high accuracy
against the one attack used during training, but give low ac-
curacy on other attacks. We have found no evidence of over-
fitting when performing the adversarial training of (Madry
et al., 2017): the minimally distorted adversarial examples
improve on the CW attack by 12% on both the hardened
and untrained networks.
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(a) Adversarial Examples generated on Madry et al. (2017)
using Carlini and Wagner (2017).
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(b) Adversarial Examples generated on Madry et al. (2017)
using Carlini and Wagner (2017).
It is easier to formally analyze Madry et al. (2017). For
both the L∞ and L1 distance metrics, it seems significantly
easier to analyze the robustness of the adversarially trained
network: when using L∞, Reluplex terminated on 81 of the
90 instances on the adversarially trained network, versus
38 on the standard network; and for L1, the termination
rate was 64 for the hardened network compared to just 6 on
the standard network. We are still looking into the reason
for this behavior. Naively, one might assume that because
the initial adversarial examples x′init provided to Reluplex
have larger distance for the hardened network, that these
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experiments will take longer to converge — but we were
seeing an opposite behavior.
One possible explanation could be that the adversarially
trained network makes less use of the nonlinear ReLU units,
and is therefore more amenable to analysis with Reluplex.
We empirically verify that this is not the case. For a given in-
stance, we track, for each ReLU unit in the network, whether
it is in the saturated zero region, or the linear x = y region.
We then compute the nonlinearity of the network as the
number of units that change from the saturated region to
the linear region, or vice versa, when going from the given
input to the discovered adversarial example. We find that
there is no statistically significant difference between the
nonlinearity of the two networks.
5. Conclusion
Neural networks hold great potential to be used in safety-
critical systems, but their susceptibility to adversarial ex-
amples poses a significant hindrance. While defenses can
be argued secure against existing attacks, it is difficult to
assess vulnerability to future attacks. The burgeoning field
of neural network verification can mitigate this problem,
by allowing us to obtain an absolute measurement of the
usefulness of a defense, regardless of the attack to be used
against it.
In this paper, we introduce provably minimally distorted
adversarial examples and show how to construct them with
formal verification approaches. We evaluate one recent
attack (Carlini and Wagner, 2017) and find it often produces
adversarial examples whose distance is within 6.6% to 13%
of optimal, and one defense (Madry et al., 2017), and find
that it increases distortion to the nearest adversarial example
by an average of 423% on the MNIST dataset for our tested
networks. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first proof
of robustness increase for a defense that was not designed
to be proven secure.
Currently available verification tools afford limited scala-
bility, which means experiments can only be conducted on
small networks. However, as better verification techniques
are developed, this limitation is expected to be lifted. Or-
thogonally, when preparing to use a neural network in a
safety-critical setting, users may choose to design their net-
works as to make them particularly amenable to verification
techniques — e.g., by using specific activation functions or
network topologies — so that strong guarantees about their
correctness and robustness may be obtained.
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